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Abstract
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) is probably the most influential
logic of strategic ability that has emerged in recent years. The idea of
ATL is centered around cooperation modalities: 〈〈A〉〉γ is satisfied if the
group A of agents has a collective strategy to enforce temporal property
γ against the worst possible response from the other agents. So, the se-
mantics of ATL shares the “all-or-nothing” attitude of many logical ap-
proaches to computation.
Such an assumption seems appropriate in some application areas (life-
critical systems, security protocols, expensive ventures like space mis-
sions). Inmany cases, however, onemight be satisfied if the goal is achieved
with reasonable likelihood. In this paper, we try to soften the rigorous
notion of success that underpinsATL.
1 Introduction
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [1, 2] is probably the most influen-
tial logic of strategic ability that has emerged in recent years. The idea ofATL
is centered around cooperation modalities 〈〈A〉〉: 〈〈A〉〉γ is satisfied if the group
of agents A has a collective strategy to enforce temporal property γ. That is,
〈〈A〉〉γ holds if A has a strategy that succeeds to make γ true against the worst
possible response from the opponents. So, the semantics of ATL shares the
“all-or-nothing” attitude of many logical approaches to computation, justi-
fied by von Neumann’s maximin evaluation of strategies in classical game
theory [29]. Such an assumption does seem appropriate in some application
areas. For life-critical systems, security protocols, and expensive ventures like
space missions it is indeed essential that nothing can go wrong (provided
that the assumptions being made are correct). In many cases, however, one
might be satisfied if the goal is achieved with reasonable likelihood. Also, it
does not seem right to assume that the rest of the agents will behave in the
most hostile anddestructiveway; theymaybe friendly, indifferent, or simply
not powerful enough to do it (for example, due to incomplete knowledge).
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Thus, to evaluate available strategies, a finer measure of success is needed
that takes into account the possibility of a non-adversary response.
Anaive (butnevertheless appealing) idea is to evaluate a strategy sby count-
ing against how many opponents’ responses it succeeds. If the ratio we get
is, say, 50%, we can say that s succeeds in 50% of the cases. Note that this ap-
proach is underpinned by the assumption that each response from the other
agents is equally likely; that is, we in fact assume that those agents play at
random. Putting it in anotherway: Aswe donot have any information about
the future strategy of the opponents, we assume a uniform distribution over
all possible response strategies. On the other hand, assuming the uniform
distribution is too strong in many scenarios, where the “proponents” may
have a more specific idea of what the opponents will do (obtained e.g. by
statistical analysis and/or learning). In order to properly address the issue,
we introduce modalities 〈〈A〉〉pωγ that say that agents A have a collective strat-
egy to enforce γ with probability of at least p ∈ [0, 1], assuming that the expected
behavior of the opponents is described by the prediction symbol ω.
In this paper, we assume that the response from the opponents is inde-
pendent from the actual strategy used by the proponents. It might be in-
teresting to consider dependencies between choices of the two parties. This
corresponds to the situation when the opponents have partial knowledge of
the proponents’ strategy. We leave further analysis of the issue for future re-
search. We would also like to investigate further the relationship between
quantitative and qualitative notions of success and come up with example
scenarios in which pATL can be used successfully.
The semantics studied here has some limitations. We consider only finite
models, andwe assume that the probabilistic predictions of opponents’ play
use only memoryless strategies. In terms of decision problems, we only in-
vestigate the complexity of model checking. Deduction, infinite models as
well as non-memoryless strategies/behaviors are thus natural avenues to be
explored in future work, too.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Alternating-time Temporal Logic
Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) [1, 2] enables reasoning about temporal
properties and strategic abilities of agents.
Definition 1 (LATL) LetAgt = {a1, . . . , ak} be a nonempty finite set of all agents,
andΠ be a set of propositions (we use p, q, r, . . . to denote propositions). LATL(Agt,Π)
is defined by the following grammar (whereA ⊆ Agt):
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉γ where γ ::= hϕ | ϕ | ϕU ϕ.
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Formulae ϕ are called state formulae, and formulae γ path formulae.
Informally, 〈〈A〉〉γ expresses that agents A have a collective strategy to en-
force γ. ATL formulae include the usual temporal operators: h(“next”), 
(“always from now on”), and U (strict “until”). Additionally, ♦ (“sometime
in the future”) can be defined as ♦γ ≡ >U γ. The path quantifiers A,E of
CTL [7] can be expressed inATLwith 〈〈∅〉〉, 〈〈Agt〉〉 respectively.
The semantics ofATL is defined by concurrent game structures.
Definition 2 (CGS) A concurrent game structure (CGS) is a tuple
M = 〈Agt,Q ,Π, pi, Act, d, o〉, consisting of: a set Agt = {a1, . . . , ak} of agents;
a set Q of states; a set Π of atomic propositions; a valuation of propositions
pi : Q → P(Π); and a finite set Act of actions. Function d : Agt × Q → P(Act)
indicates the actions available to agent a ∈ Agt in state q ∈ Q . We often write
da(q) instead of d(a, q), and use d(q) to denote the set da1(q) × · · · × dak(q) of ac-
tion profiles in state q. Finally, o is a transition function which maps each state
q ∈ Q and action profile−→α = 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 ∈ d(q) to another state q′ = o(q,−→α ).
In this paper, we will only deal with finite models, i.e., we assume that the sets
of states and actions in each model are finite.
A (memoryless) strategy sa : Q → Act is a conditional plan that specifies
what a ∈ Agt is going to do for every possible situation.1 We denote the set
of such functions by Σa. A collective strategy sA for team A ⊆ Agt specifies an
individual strategy for each agent a ∈ A; the set of A’s collective strategies
is given by ΣA =
∏
a∈A Σa. A path λ = q0q1 . . . in model M is an infinite
sequence of states that can be effected by subsequent transitions. We use
λ[n] to denote the nth state in λ; λ[i..j] denotes the subpath of λ between
positions i and j (also for j =∞). Λ(q) denotes the set of all the paths starting
in state q. Function out(q, sA) returns the set of all paths thatmay result from
agentsA executing strategy sA from state q onward.
Definition 3 (Semantics of ATL) LetM be a CGS, q a state inM , and λ a
path inM . The semantics is given by the satisfaction relation |= as follows:
M, q |= p iff p ∈ pi(q) (for p ∈ Π);
M, q |= ¬ϕ iffM, q 6|= ϕ;
M, q |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iffM, q |= ϕ1 andM, q |= ϕ2;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉γ iff there is a collective strategy sA such that, for everyλ ∈ out(q, sA)
we haveM,λ |= γ;
M,λ |= hϕ iffM,λ[1..∞] |= ϕ;
1 This is a deviation from the original semantics ofATL [1, 2], where strategies assign agents’
choices to sequences of states. We note, however, that both types of strategies yield equivalent
semantics for “vanilla”ATL [24].
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Figure 1: A simple CGSM1 = 〈{1, 2}, {q0, q1, q2}, {r, s}, pi, {α, α′, β, β′}, d, o〉; pi,
d, and o can be read off from the figure. By ?we refer to any possible action.
M,λ |= ϕ iffM,λ[i..∞] |= ϕ for all i ∈ N0;
M,λ |= ϕ1 U ϕ2 iffM,λ[i..∞] |= ϕ2 for some i ≥ 0, and λ[j..∞] |= ϕ1 for all
0 ≤ j ≤ i.
Note that alternatively, one candefine the semantics ofATL entirely in terms
of states.
Example 1 Consider a simple two-agent scenario depicted in Figure 1. Agent 1
(resp. 2) can perform actions α and α′ (resp. β and β′). For example, strategy
profile (α, β), performed in q0, leads to state q1 in which r holds. Agent 1 can enforce
neither r nor s on its own:M1, q0 |= ¬〈〈1〉〉 hr ∧¬〈〈1〉〉 hs, and neither can agent 2.
However, the agents can cooperate to determine the outcome:M1, q0 |= 〈〈1, 2〉〉 hr∧
〈〈1, 2〉〉 hs.
2.2 Probability Theory
In this section we recall some basic notions from probability theory. Let X
be a non-empty set and let F ⊆ P(X) be a set of subsets. F is called a (set)
algebra over X iff: (i) ∅ ∈ F ; (ii) if A ∈ F then also A¯ := X \ A ∈ F ; and
(iii) if A,B ∈ F then also A ∪ B ∈ F . F is called a σ-algebra if additionally to
(i-iii) it also holds (iv)
⋃∞
i=1Ai ∈ F for allA1, A2, · · · ∈ F .
Let S be a σ-algebra overX. We say that a function µ : S → R is ameasure
(on S) iff it is non-negative, i.e. µ(A) ≥ 0 for all A ∈ S, and σ-additive, i.e.
µ(
⋃∞
i=1Ai) =
∑∞
i=1 µ(Ai) whenever each Ai ∈ S. Finally, we say that the
measure µ is a probability measure if µ(X) = 1 and call the triple (X,S, µ) a
probability space. By Ξ(S) we denote the set of all probability measures over
S.
Note that wheneverX is finite it is sufficient to define the probabilities of
the basic elements x ∈ X. Then, the probability of an event E ⊆ X is given
by the sum of the basic probabilities: µ(E) =
∑
x∈E µ({x}), and the cor-
responding probability measure is uniquely determined over the σ-algebra
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P(X). In such cases, we can also write µ(x) instead of µ({x}) and Ξ(X) in-
stead of Ξ(P(X)), and also refer to a probabilitymeasure over P(X) as proba-
bility measure overX.
3 ATLwith Probability
In this section we propose and discuss our new logic pATL (ATL with proba-
bilistic success). Firstly, we define the syntax and the semantics on an abstract
level. Then, we instantiate the semantics for two different ways of model-
ing the opponents’ behavior: namely, by mixed and behavioral memoryless
strategies. Finally, we discuss the relation of pATL to “pure”ATL.
3.1 Syntax
In pATL, cooperationmodalities 〈〈A〉〉 of the originalATL are replaced with
a richer family of strategic modalities 〈〈A〉〉pω.
Definition 4 (LpATL) The basic language LpATL(Agt,Π,Ω) is defined over the
nonempty setsΠ of propositions,Agt = {a1, . . . , ak} of agents, andΩ of prediction
symbols. The language consists of all state formulae ϕ defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉pωγ; where γ ::= hϕ | ϕ | ϕU ϕ,
ω ∈ Ω, and p ∈ [0, 1]. Additional temporal operators are defined as before.
We use p, ω, a,A to refer to a typical proposition, a prediction symbol, an
agent, and a group of agents, respectively. The informal reading of formula
〈〈A〉〉pωγ is: TeamA can bring about γ with success level of at least pwhen the oppo-
nents behave according to ω. The prediction symbols are used to assume some
“predicted behavior” of the opponents.
3.2 Semantics: The Abstract Framework
Now we define the semantics of pATL in a generic way before considering
more concrete settings. Models forpATL extend concurrent game structures
with prediction denotation functionswhich, given a groupof agents, assignpre-
diction symbols to predicted behaviors. We use a non-empty set BH to refer to
all possible predicted behaviors. There are several sensible ways how BH can
be instantiated: Mixed and behavioral strategies provide two well-known pos-
sibilities (cf. Sections 3.3 and 3.4). One can also think about other kinds of
predictions – for instance, as a combination of mixed and behavioral strate-
gies: for some agents it might be rational to assume that they behave accord-
ing to the former and others according to the latter kind of strategies.
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Definition 5 (Prediction denotation function) Let BH be a non-empty
set representing possible (probabilistic) behaviors of the agents. A prediction de-
notation function is a function [[·]] : Ω × P(Agt) → BH where [[ω,A]] denotes a
(probabilistic) prediction ofA’s behavior according to the prediction symbol ω ∈ Ω.
We write [[ω]]A for [[ω,A]].
Models for pATL extend CGSwith such functions.
Definition 6 (Models of pATL) A concurrent game structure with proba-
bility (CGSP) is given by a tupleM = 〈Agt,Q ,Π, pi, Act, d, o,Ω, [[·]]〉where 〈Agt,Q ,Π, pi, Act, d, o〉
is a CGS, Ω is a set of prediction symbols, and [[·]] is a prediction denotation func-
tion.
Our semantics of 〈〈A〉〉pω is based on the generic notion of a success measure.
The actual instantiation of the notion will usually depend on a (probabilis-
tic) prediction (from BH) specified by the prediction denotation function
and a prediction symbol. The measure indicates “how successful” a group
of agents is wrt property γ (i.e. with which probability the formula may be-
come satisfied) if the opponents behave according to their predicted behav-
ior. The semantics of pATL, parameterized by a success measure, updates
the ATL semantics from the previous section by replacing the rule for the
cooperationmodalities.
Definition 7 (Successmeasure) A success measure success is a function
that takes a strategy of the proponents sA, a probabilistic prediction [[ω]]Agt\A of the
opponents’ behavior, the current state of the system q, and a pATL path formula γ
and returns a score success(sA, [[ω]]Agt\A, q, γ) from [0, 1].
Definition 8 (Semantics of pATL) LetM be aCGSP. The semantics ofpATL
updates the clauses from Definition 3 by replacing the clause for 〈〈A〉〉 with the fol-
lowing:
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉pωγ iff there is sA ∈ ΣA such that success(sA, [[ω]]Agt\A, q, γ) ≥ p.
Various success measures may prove appropriate for different purposes;
they inherently depend on the type of the prediction denotation functions
and therewith on the possible predicted behaviors represented by BH.
3.3 Opponents’ Play: Mixed Strategies
As the first instantiation of the generic framework, we consider mixed mem-
oryless strategies which are probability distributions over pure memoryless
strategies of the opponents. This notion of behavior fits well our initial in-
tuition of counting the favorable opponents’ responses in order to determine the
success level of a strategy.
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Definition 9 (Mixedmemoryless strategy) Amixed memoryless strat-
egy (mms) σA forA ⊆ Agt is a probability measure over P(ΣA).
Definition 10 (mms denotation function) Ammsdenotation function
is a prediction denotation function with BH = ⋃A⊆Agt Ξ(ΣA), such that [[ω]]A ∈
Ξ(ΣA). [[ω]]A(s) denotes the probability that s will be played by A according to the
prediction symbol ω.
Similarly, the abstract success measure defined in Definition 7 can be in-
stantiated as follows. A success measure for mms’s is given by a function
whichmaps a strategy sA ∈ ΣA, amms σAgt\A ∈ Ξ(ΣAgt\A), a state q ∈ Q , and a
pATLpath formula γ to a value between0 and1, i.e. success(sA, σAgt\A , q, γ) ∈
[0, 1]. The success function tells to what extent agents A will achieve γ by
playing sA from q on, when we expect the opponents (Agt \ A) to behave
according to σAgt\A .
In this paper, we take the success measure of a mms wrt property γ to be
the expected probability of making γ true. For this purpose, we first define the
outcome of a strategy.
Definition 11 (Outcome of a strategy against amms) Theoutcome of
strategy sA against a mixed memoryless strategy σAgt\A at state q is the probability
measure over Λ(q) given by:
O(sA, σAgt\A, q)(λ) :=
∑
t∈Resp(sA,λ)
σAgt\A(t)
where Resp(sA, λ) = {t ∈ ΣAgt\A | λ ∈ out(q, 〈sA, t〉)} is the set of all response
strategies t of the opponents, that, together withA’s strategy sA, result in path λ.2
Thus,O(sA, σAgt\A , q)(λ) sumsup theprobabilities of all responses inResp(sA, λ),
for each path λ. In consequence, O(sA, σAgt\A , q)(λ) denotes the probability
that the opponents will play a strategy resulting in λ. Note also that, when
memoryless strategies are played, the same action vector is performed every
time a particular state is revisited, which restricts the set of paths than can
occur. That the outcome is a probability measure is shown in the following
proposition but at first we introduceminimal periodic pathswhich are impor-
tant for memoryless strategies.
Definition 12 (Minimal periodic path, Λmp(q)) We say that a path λ ∈
Λ(q) isminimal periodic if, and only if, the path can bewritten as λ = λ[0, j]λ[j+
1, i] . . . λ[j + 1, i] where i ∈ N0 is theminimal natural number such that there is
some j < i and λ[i] = λ[j]. The set of all minimal periodic paths starting in q is
denoted byΛmp(q). We note that, for a finite model, the setΛmp(q) consists of only
finitely many paths.
2 Note that for a deterministic strategy profile 〈sA, tAgt\A〉 the outcome set contains exactly
one path.
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Proposition 1 O(sA, σAgt\A, q) is a probabilitymeasure overΛ(q) and overΛmp(q).
Proof ThatO(sA, ·, q) is non-negative follows from the fact that σAgt\A(t) ≥ 0
for all response strategies t. It is easy to see that all non minimal periodic
paths have probability zero since we consider memoryless strategies only.
This implies that there are only finitely many paths with non-zero probabil-
ity. Thus,O(sA, σAgt\A, q) isσ-additive, and the followingholds: O(sA, σA, q)(Λ(q)) =
O(sA, σA, q)(Λmp(q)) =
∑
λ∈Λmp(q)
∑
t∈Resp(sA,λ) σB(t) =
∑
t∈ ˆResp(sA) σB(t)where
ˆResp(sA) consists of all strategies t ∈ ΣB such that there is a path λ ∈ Λmp(q)
with λ ∈ out(q, 〈sA, t〉). But then ˆResp(sA) = ΣB and thus the sum is equal to
1. 
Definition 13 (Successmeasurewithmms) The successmeasure against
mixed memoryless strategies is defined as below:
success(sA, σAgt\A, q, γ) =
∑
λ∈Λ(q)
holdsγ(λ) · O(sA, σAgt\A, q)(λ),
where holdsγ(λ) =
{
1 ifM,λ |= γ
0 else.
Function holdsγ : Λ → {0, 1} can be seen as a characteristic function of the path
formula γ: It indicates, for each path λ, whether γ holds on λ or not.
By Proposition 1, success(sA, σAgt\A, q, γ) is indeed an expected value, and it
is actually defined by a finite sum. Moreover, measuring the success of strat-
egy sA by counting the favorable vs. all responses of the opponents is a spe-
cial case, obtained by setting [[ω]]Agt\A to the uniformprobability distribution
over ΣAgt\A.
Example 2 Consider the system from Example 1. We have discussed in Sec-
tion 2.1 that 1 is able to enforce neither r nor s. However, it might be the case that
additional information about 2’s behavior is available, namely that 2 plays action
β′ more often than β (say, seven out of every ten times). This kind of observation
can be formalized by a probability measure σ over {β, β′} with σ(β) = 0.3 and
σ(β′) = 0.7.
Using ATL, it was not possible to state any “positive” fact about 1’s power.
pATL allows a finer-grained analysis. We can now state that 1 can enforce any
outcome (r or s) with probability at least 0.7. Formally, let [[ω]]2 = σ. We have that
M, q0 |= 〈〈1〉〉0.7ω hr∧ 〈〈1〉〉0.7ω hs. If 1 desires r, he should play α′ since 〈α′, β′〉 leads
to r; otherwise the agent should select action α in q0.
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3.4 Opponents’ Play: Behavioral Strategies
In this sectionwepresent an alternative instantiationof the semantics, where
the prediction of opponents’ play is based on the notion of behavioral strate-
gies (which follows theMarkovian assumption that the probability of taking
an action depends only on the state where it is executed). We show that the
semantics is well defined for pATL.
Definition 14 (Behavioral strategy) A behavioral strategy forA ⊆ Agt is
a function βA : Q →
⋃
q∈Q Ξ(dA(q)) such that βA(q) is a probability measure over
dA(q), i.e., βA(q) ∈ Ξ(dA(q)). We use BA to denote the set of behavioral strategies
ofA.
Definition 15 (Behavioral strategy denotation function) Abehavioral
strategy denotation function is a prediction denotation function with BH =⋃
A⊆Agt BA, such that [[ω]]A ∈ BA. Thus, [[ω]]A(q)(−→α ) denotes the probability that
the collective action−→α will be played by agentsA in state q according to the predic-
tion symbol ω.
As in the case of mixed memoryless strategies (cf. Definition 11), the out-
come of a strategy against behavioral predictions is a probability measure
over paths. However, the setting is more complicated now. For mixed pre-
dictions it suffices to consider a probability distribution over the finite set
of pure strategies which induces a probability measure over the set of paths.
Indeed, only finite prefixes of paths, namely the non-looping parts, are rel-
evant for the outcome (once a state is reentered, the same actions are per-
formed again in a memoryless strategy). For behavioral strategies, actions
(rather than strategies) are probabilistically determined, whichmakes it pos-
sible for different actions to be executed when the system returns to a previ-
ously visited state. Thus, the probability of a specific set of paths depends on
thewhole paths that belong to the set.
To define the outcome of a behavioral strategy we first need to define the
probability space induced by the probabilities of one-step transitions; to this
end, we follow the construction from [18]. Recall thatΛ(q) denotes the set of
all infinite paths starting in q. The probability of a set of paths is defined in-
ductively by consistently assigning probabilities to all finite initial segments
(prefixes) of a path. The intuition is that prefix h can be used to represent the
set of infinite paths that extend h. By imposing closure wrt complement and
(countable) union, we obtain a probability measure for some sets of paths.
Of course, not every set of paths can be constructed this way, but we prove (in
Proposition 2) that all the relevant sets can.
We use Λn(q) to denote the set of finite prefixes (histories) of length n of
the paths from Λ(q); note that Λn(q) is always finite for finite models. Now,
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we define Fn(q) and F(q) to be the following sets of subsets of Λ(q):
Fn(q) := {{λ | λ[0, n− 1] ∈ T} ∣∣ T ⊆ Λn(q)} and F(q) := ∞⋃
n=0
Fn(q).
That is, for each set of prefixes T ⊆ Λn(q), the set Fn(q) includes the set of all
their infinite extensions. Note that every Fn(q) is a σ-algebra. Each element
S of Fn(q) (often called cylinder set) can be written as a finite union of basic
cylinder sets [hi] := {λ ∈ Λ(q) | hi ≤ λ}where hi ∈ Λn(q) is a history of length
n and hi ≤ λ denotes that hi is an initial prefix of λ; so, S =
⋃
i[hi] for appro-
priate hi ∈ Λn(q). We use these basic cylinder sets to define an appropriate
probability measure.
A basic cylinder set [hi] consists of all extensions of hi; hence, the proba-
bility that one of hi’s extensions λ ∈ [hi]will occur is equal to the probability
that hi will take place. Given a strategy sA and a behavioral response βAgt\A ,
the probability for [hi], hi = q0 . . . qn, is defined as the product of subsequent
transition probabilities:
νsAβAgt\A
([hi]) :=
n−1∏
i=0
∑
−→α∈Act(sA,qi,qi+1)
βAgt\A(qi)(
−→α )
where Act(sA, qi, qi+1) = {−→α ∈ dAgt\A(qi) | qi+1 = o(qi, 〈sA(qi),−→α 〉)} con-
sists of all action profiles which can be performed in qi and which lead to
qi+1 given the choices sA of agents A. According to [18], function νsAβAgt\A is
uniquely defined on F(q) and the restriction of νsAβAgt\A to F
n(q) is a measure
on Fn(q) for each n. Still, F(q) is not a σ-algebra.
Therefore, we take S(q) to be the smallest σ-algebra containing F(q) and
extend νsAβAgt\A to a measure on S(q) as follows:
µsAβAgt\A
(S) := inf
C∈H(S)
{
νsAβAgt\A
(⋃
C
)}
where S ∈ S(q) and H(S) denotes the denumerable set of coverings of S by
basic cylinder sets. That is,H(S) consists of sets {[h1], [h2], . . . } such that S ⊆⋃
i[hi]. According to [18], we have that (Λ(q),S(q), µsAβAgt\A ) is a probability
space. Actually, µsAβAgt\A is the unique extension of ν
sA
βAgt\A
on Fn(q) to the σ-
algebra S(q) [18, Theorem 1.19]; in particular, thismeans that bothmeasures
coincide on all sets from F(q). We refer to µsAβAgt\A as the probability measure
on S(q) induced by the pure strategy sA and the behavioral strategy βAgt\A .
Definition 16 (Successmeasurewith behavioralmemoryless strategies)
Like in the previous section, the success measure of strategy sA wrt the formula γ
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is defined as the expected value of the characteristic function of γ (i.e., holdsγ) over
(Λ(q),S(q), µsAβAgt\A ).
success(sA, βAgt\A , q, γ) := E[holdsγ ] =
∫
Λ(q)
holdsγdµsAβAgt\A .
Note that the formulation uses a Lebesgue integral over the σ-algebra S(q).
Nowwe can show that the semantics ofpATLwith behavioral strategies is
well-defined. We first prove that holdsγ is S(q)-measurable (i.e., every preim-
age of holdsγ is an element of S(q) and thus can be assigned ameasure); then,
we show that holdsγ is integrable.
Proposition 2 Function holdsγ is S(q)-measurable and µsAβAgt\A -integrable for
any pATL-path formula γ.
Proof In particular, wehave to show that holds−1γ (A) := {λ ∈ Λ(q) | holdsγ(λ) ∈
A} ismeasurable for everyA ⊆ {0, 1} (i.e., holds−1γ (A) ∈ S(q)). The cases ∅ and
{0, 1} are trivial. The case for {0} is clear if we have shown it for A = {1} (cf.
property (ii) of σ-algebras, Section 2.2). Therefore, let fγ := holds−1γ ({1}). The
proof proceeds by structural induction on γ.
I. Case “”: (i) Let γ = p where p is a propositional logic formula (e.g.
p = r ∧ ¬s). We define Lpn := {λ ∈ Λ(q) | ∀i ∈ N0(0 ≤ i < n → M,λ[i] |= p}.
We have that each Lpn ∈ Fn(q) ⊆ S(q) and that
⋂
n∈N L
p
n = fγ ; hence, also
that fγ ∈ S(q) because of property (ii) and (iv) of σ-algebras (cf. Section 2.2).
That fγ is integrable follows from Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence The-
orem: fγ is measurable and |fγ | is bounded by the µsAβAgt\A -integrable (con-
stant) function 1. (ii) Let γ = 〈〈B〉〉pω′γ′ and suppose fγ′ is already proven
to be integrable. Then, L〈〈B〉〉
p
ω′γ
′
n can be defined in the same way as above.
(iii) Suppose that for each sub path formula γ′ contained in ϕ1 and ϕ2 we
have proven that fγ′ is integrable, then Lγn can be defined in the same way as
above for γ = ¬ϕ1 and γ = (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2).
II. Case“ h”: Similar to I(i)wedefineL hpn := {λ ∈ Λ(q) | n > 1 andM,λ[1] |=
p}. Then, we have that ⋃n∈N L hpn = f hp ∈ S(q). The rest of the proof is
done analogously to I.
III. Case “U ”: Here, we also just consider the part corresponding to I(i). We
set LpU qn := {λ ∈ Λ(q) | ∃j(0 ≤ j < n → (M,λ[j] |= q ∧ ∀i ∈ N0(0 ≤ i < j →
M,λ[i] |= p))}; then, we have that⋃n∈N0 LpU qn = fpU q ∈ S(q). 
Note that pATLwith behavioral strategies can be seen as a special case of
the multi-agent Markov Temporal LogicMTL from [17], since 〈〈A〉〉pωγ can be
rewritten as theMTL formula p 4 (strAgt\Aω)〈〈A〉〉γ.
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3.5 Relationship to ATL
Firstly, we observe that an analogous success measure can be constructed for
ATL:
successATL(sA, q, γ) = min
λ∈out(sA,q)
{holdsγ(λ)}.
Then,M, q |=ATL 〈〈A〉〉γ iff there is a sA ∈ ΣA such that successATL(sA, q, γ) = 1.
Thus, the abstract framework can be instantiated in a way that embraces the
original semantics ofATL. Alternatively, we can try to embedATL in pATL
using the probabilistic success measures we have already defined.
3.5.1 Embedding ATL in pATLwithMixed Strategies
We consider pATLwith mixed memoryless strategies. The idea is to require
that every response strategy has a non-zero probability. Note that a given
CGSPM induces a CGSM ′ in a straightforward way: Only the set of predic-
tion symbols and the prediction denotation function must be left out. In
the following we will also use CGSP’s together withATL formulae (without
probability) by implicitly considering the induced CGS’s.
Theorem 3 Let γ be an ATL path formula with no cooperation modalities, and
letω be a prediction symbol describing amixedmemoryless strategy such that [[ω]]Agt\A(t) >
0 for every t ∈ ΣAgt\A. Then, for all modelsM and states q inM it holds that:
M, q |=ATL 〈〈A〉〉γ iffM, q |=pATL 〈〈A〉〉1ωγ.
Proof Let A¯ := Agt \ A for A ⊆ Agt. “⇒”: Assume that sA ∈ ΣA and that for
all λ ∈ out(q, sA) it holds thatM,λ |= γ. Now suppose thatM, q 6|=pATL 〈〈A〉〉1ωγ.
In particular that wouldmean that success(sA, σA, q, γ) =
∑
λ∈Λ(q) holdsγ(λ) ·∑
t∈Resp(sA,λ) σA¯(t) < 1. This can only be caused by two cases: (1) There is a
path λ ∈ Λ(q) a strategy t ∈ Resp(sA, λ)with σA¯(t) > 0 and holdsγ(λ) = 0. But
then λ ∈ out(q, sA) contradicts the assumption that sA is successfully.
(2) There is a strategy t ∈ ΣA¯ with σA¯(t) > 0 and for all λ ∈ Λ(q) it holds that
t 6∈ Resp(sA, λ) (*). But there must be a path λ with {λ} = out(q, (sA, t)) and
thus t ∈ Resp(sA, λ), which contradicts (*).
“⇐”: Assume that sA ∈ ΣA and success(sA, σA, q, γ) = 1. Suppose that
there is a path λ ∈ out(q, sA) withM,λ 6|= γ. This means that strategy t with
out(q, (sA, t)) = {λ} is in Resp(sA, λ) but plays no role in the calculation of
the success value since holdsγ(λ) = 0. This contradicts the assumption that
success(sA, σA, q, γ) = 1.  Note that Theorem 3 holds only forATL, and
not forATL∗.3
3ATL∗ is an extension ofATLwhich in particular allows for combinations of temporal oper-
ators
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q1 q2 p
(α, β)
(α, α) (α, α)
Figure 2: CGSM2 with actions α and β. The ? ∈ {α, β} refers to any of the
two actions.
Condition [[ω]]Agt\A(t) > 0 ensures that no “bad response” of the oppo-
nents is neglected because of zero probability. Since we only deal with finite
models, the uniform distribution over ΣA is always well defined.
Corollary 4 Let uA be a prediction symbol that denotes the uniform distribution
over strategies of the agents in A, and let tr(ϕ) replace all occurrences of 〈〈A〉〉 by
〈〈A〉〉1uAgt\A in ϕ. Then,M, q |=ATL ϕ iffM, q |=pATL tr(ϕ).
3.5.2 ATL vs. pATLwith Behavioral Strategies
Now we examine the connection between ATL and pATL with behavioral
strategies. In Theorem 3 we have shown that, under the semantics based on
mixed response strategies, theATL operator 〈〈A〉〉 can be replaced by 〈〈A〉〉1ω if
all response strategies have non-zero probability according to ω. One could
expect the same for behavioral strategies if it is assumed that each “response
action” is left possible; however, an analogous result does not hold. That is
because we consider probabilities over all infinite paths in the system, which
makes for a continuous probability space. Thus, the probability that a par-
ticular path will occur is zero, while it still can occur, cf. Example 3. Proposi-
tion 5 is an immediate corollary: pATL with behavioral predictions cannot
simulate plainATL operators in a straightforwardway. Still, as Proposition 6
shows, that canbedone in the subclass of acyclicCGS (the resultwill become
important for the model checking analysis in Section 4.2).
Example 3 LetM ′2 be theCGSP based onCGSM2 shown in Figure 2. Note that
M, q1 |= ¬〈〈a1〉〉♦p.What happens if agent a2 behaves according to a behavioral
strategy? Let βa2 be the behavioral strategy specified as follows: βa2(q1)(α) = ,
βa2(q1)(β) = 1− , and βa2(q2)(α) = 1 where 0 <  < 1. This behavioral strategy
assigns non-zero probability to all actions of a2. Then, for a symbol ω with [[ω]]a2 =
βa2 we have thatM, q1 |= 〈〈a1〉〉1ω♦p. Thus, a1 has a strategy which guarantees ♦p
with expected probability 1. The reason for that is due to the fact that the only
possible path which can prevent ♦p is q1q1q1 . . . . But the probability that this is
going to happen is limn→∞
∏n
i=1  = 0.
Proposition 5 There is an ATL path formula γ, a modelM and a state q such
thatM, q |=ATL ¬〈〈A〉〉γ butM, q |=pATL 〈〈A〉〉1ωγ for every behavioral strategy.
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Let us define a sink state as a statewith a loop to itself being the only outgo-
ing transition. A CGS (resp. CGSP) is acyclic iff it contains no cycles except
for the loops at sink states. Such a model includes only a finite number of
paths, so the following proposition canbe proven analogously to Theorem3.
Proposition 6 LetM be an acyclic CGS and ω denote a behavioral prediction
for Agt \ A in which every action is possible (i.e., [[ω]]Agt\A(q)(−→α ) > 0 for every
q ∈ Q ,−→α ∈ dAgt\A(q)). Then,M, q |=ATL 〈〈A〉〉γ iffM, q |=pATL 〈〈A〉〉1ωγ.
4 Model Checking
In this section, we discuss the complexity of model checking formulae of
our “ATLwith probabilistic success”. We have presented two alternative se-
mantics for the logic, underpinned by two different ways of assuming the
opponents’ behavior. The semantics based on mixed strategies seems to be
the simpler of the two, as the success measure is based on a finite probabil-
ity distribution, and hence can be computed as a finite sum of elements. In
contrast, the semantics based on behavioral strategies refers to an integral of
a continuous probability distribution – so one might expect that checking
formulae ofpATL in the latter case ismuch harder. Surprisingly, it turns out
to be the opposite.
4.1 ModelCheckingpATLwithMixedOpponents’ Strate-
gies
We study the model checking problem with respect to the number of tran-
sitions in the model (m) and the length of the formula (l). As the number
ofmemoryless strategies is usually exponential in the number of transitions,
we need a compact way of representing mixed strategies (representing them
explicitly as arrays of probability values would yield structures of exponen-
tial size). For the rest of this section, we assume that a mixed strategy is rep-
resented as a sequence of pairs [〈C1, p1〉, . . . , 〈Cn, pn〉], where the length of the
sequence is polynomial inm, l, every Ci is a condition on strategies that can
be checked in polynomial time wrtm, l, and every pi ∈ [0, 1] is a probability
value with a polynomial representation wrt m, l. For simplicity, we assume
that conditions Ci are mutually exclusive. The idea is that the probability of
strategy s is determined as p(s) = pi by the condition Ci which holds for s; if
no Ci holds for s then the probability of s is 0. We also assume that the distri-
bution is normalized, i.e.,
∑
s∈Σ p(s) = 1 where p(s) denotes the probability
of s determined by the representation given above.
In this setting, model checking pATL with mixed memoryless strategies
turns out to be at leastPP-hard, wherePP (“Probabilistic Polynomial time”)
is the class of decision problems solvable by a probabilistic Turing machine
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Figure 3: The concurrent epistemic game structure for formula F ≡ (x1 ∨
¬x3 ∨ x4) ∧ (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3). States q11, q21 and q12, q23 are indistinguishable for
the agent: the same action (valuation) must be specified in both within a
uniform strategy.
in polynomial time,with an error probability of less than1/2 for all instances [11].
We prove it by a polynomial-time reduction of “Majority SAT”, a typicalPP-
complete problem. Since PP contains both NP and co-NP [5], we obtain
NP-hardness and co-NP-hardness as an immediate corollary.
Definition 17 (MAJSAT [22]) The problemMAJSAT is formulated as follows:
Given a Boolean formula F in conjunctive normal form with propositional vari-
ables x1, . . . , xn, answer YES if more than half of all assignments of x1, . . . , xn
make F true, and NO otherwise.
Proposition 7 Model checking pATL with mixed memoryless strategies isPP-
hard.
Proof sketch We prove the hardness by a reduction of MAJSAT. First, we take
the formulaF and construct a single agent concurrent epistemic game struc-
ture M in a way similar to [24]. The model includes 2 special states: q>
(the winning state) and q⊥ (the losing state), plus one state for each literal
instance in F . The “literal” states are organized in levels, according to the
clause they appear in: qij refers to the jth literal of clause i. At each “literal”
state, the agent can declare the underlying proposition true or false. If the
declaration validates the literal, then the system proceeds to the next clause;
otherwise it proceeds to the next literal in the same clause. For example,
if q12 refers to literal ¬x3, then action “true” makes the system proceed to q13
(in search of another literal thatwould validate clause 1), while action “false”
changes the state to q21 (to validate the next clause). In case the last literal in
a clause has been invalidated, the system proceeds to q⊥; when a literal in
the last clause is validated, a transition to q> follows. There is a single atomic
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proposition win in the model, which holds only in state q>. An example of
the construction is shown in Figure 3.
Every two nodes with the same underlying proposition are connected by
an indistinguishability link to ensure that strategies consistently assign vari-
ables x1, . . . , xn with Boolean values. To achieve this, it is enough to require
that only uniform strategies are used by the agent; a strategy is uniform iff it
specifies the same choices in indistinguishable states. Now we observe the
following facts:
• There is a 1–1 correspondence between assignments of x1, . . . , xn and
uniform strategies of the validating agent. Also, each uniform strategy
s determines exactly one path λ(s) starting from q11;
• By the above, the number of uniform strategies is equal to the number
of different assignments of x1, . . . , xn. Thus, there are D = 2n uniform
strategies in total;
• A uniform strategy successfully validates F iff it enforces path λ(s) that
achieves q>, i.e., one for which λ(s) |= ♦win;
• Uniformity of a strategy can be checked in time polynomial wrtm (the
number of transitions in the model). Let C be an encoding of the uni-
formity condition; then, mixed strategy [〈C, 1D 〉] assigns the same im-
portance to every uniform strategy and discards all non-uniform ones.
We define symbol ω to denote that strategy;
• MAJSAT(F)=YES iff # assignments V of x1,...,xn such that V |=F# all assignments of x1,...,xn ≥ 0.5 iff
# uniform strategies s such that λ(s)|=♦win
# all uniform strategies ≥ 0.5 iff M, q11 |= 〈〈∅〉〉0.5ω ♦win,
which concludes the reduction. 
Corollary 8 Model checking pATLwith mms’s isNP-hard and co-NP-hard.
For the upper bound, we present a PSPACE algorithm for model check-
ing pATL with mms’s. The algorithm uses an NP#P procedure, i.e., one
which runs in nondeterministic polynomial timewith calls to an oracle that
counts thenumber of acceptingpaths of anondeterministic polynomial time
Turingmachine [26]. The classNP#P is known to lie betweenPH andPSPACE [25].
Theorem 9 Model checkingpATLwithmixedmemoryless strategies is inPSPACE.
Proof Sketch Let γ be apath formula that doesnot include cooperationmodal-
ities. The following procedure checks ifM, q |= 〈〈A〉〉pωγ:
1. Nondeterministically choose a strategy sA of agentsA; /requires at most m
steps/
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2. For each 〈Ci, pi〉 ∈ [[ω]], execute Ti := oracle(sA, Ci); /polynomially many calls/
3. Answer YES if
∑
i piTi ≥ p and NO otherwise. /computation polynomial in the
representation of pi and Ti/
The oracle computes the number ofAgt\A’s strategies tAgt\A such that tAgt\A
obeys Ci and 〈sA, tAgt\A〉 generate a path that satisfies γ. That is, the oracle
counts the accepting paths of the following nondeterministic Turing ma-
chine:
1. Nondet. choose a strategy tAgt\A of agents Agt \A; /requires at most m steps/
2. Check whether tAgt\A satisfies Ci; /polynomially many steps/
3. If so, “trim” modelM by removing choices that are not in 〈sA, tAgt\A〉,
then model-check the CTL formula Aγ in the resulting model and re-
turn the answer of that algorithm; otherwise return NO. /m steps + CTL
model checking which is polynomial in m, l [7]/
The main procedure runs in timeNP#P, and hence the task can be done
inpolynomial space [25]. For the casewhen γ includesnested strategicmodal-
ities, the procedure is applied recursively (bottom-up). That is, we get a de-
terministic Turing machine with adaptive calls to the PSPACE procedure.
SincePPSPACE = PSPACE, we obtain the upper bound. 
4.2 ModelCheckingpATLwithBehavioralOpponents’
Strategies
The semantics of pATL with opponents’ behavior modeled by behavioral
strategies is mathematically more advanced than for mixed strategies. So,
onemay expect the correspondingmodel checkingproblem tobe evenharder
than the one we studied in Section 4.1. Surprisingly, it turns out that check-
ingpATLwith behavioral strategies can be done in polynomial timewrt the
number of transitions in themodel (m) and the length of the formula (l). Be-
low, we sketch the proceduremcheck(M, q, ϕ) that checks whetherM, q |= ϕ:
• ϕ ≡ p, ¬ψ, or ψ1 ∧ ψ2: proceed as usual;
• ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉pωψ: (for ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉
p
ω
hψ and ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉pωψ1 U ψ2 analogously)
1. Model checkψ inM recursively. Replaceψwith a new proposition
yesholding in exactly those states st ∈ Q forwhichmcheck(M, st, ψ) =
YES;
2. Reconstruct M as a 2-player CGSP M ′ with agent 1 representing
team A and 2 representing Agt \ A. That is, d′1(st) =
∏
a∈A da(st),
d′2(st) =
∏
a∈Agt\A da(st) for each st ∈ Q , and the transition func-
tion o′ is updated accordingly.
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3. Fix the behavior of agent 2 in M ′ according to [[ω]]Agt\A. That is,
construct the probabilistic transition function o′′ so that, for each
st, st′ ∈ Q , α1 ∈ d′1(st): o′′(st, α1, st′) =
∑
{α2∈d′2(st)|o′(st,α1,α2)=st′}[[ω]]Agt\A(st, α2).
Also, reconstruct proposition yes as a reward function that assigns
1 at state st if yes ∈ pi′(st) and 0 otherwise. Note that the resulting
structureM ′′ is a Markov Decision Process [6];
4. Model check the formula ∃yes of “Discounted CTL” [8] inM ′′, q
and return the answer. This can be done in time polynomial in the
number of transitions inM ′′ and exponential in the length of the
formula [8]. Note, however, that the length of ∃yes is constant.
Since part 2-4 requiresO(m) steps, and it is repeated atmost l times (once per
subformula of ϕ), we get that the procedure runs in timeO(ml).
For the lower bound, we observe that reachability in And-Or-Graphs [15]
can be reduced (in constant time) to model checking of the fixed ATL for-
mula 〈〈a〉〉♦p over acyclicCGS (cf. [2]). Alternatively, one can reduce the Cir-
cuit Value Problem [28] to ATL model checking over acyclic CGS in a sim-
ilar way. By Proposition 6, this reduces (again in constant time) to model
checking of pATL with behavioral predictions. In consequence, we get the
following.
Theorem 10 Model checking pATL with the opponents’ behavior modeled by
behavioral memoryless strategies isP-complete with respect to the number of tran-
sitions in the model and the length of the formula.
Thus, it turns out that the model checking problem associated with the
more sophisticated semantics can be done in linear time wrt the input size,
whilemodel checking the seemingly simpler semantics ismuchharder (NP-
and co-NP-hard).
5 Conclusions andRelatedWork
In this paper, we combine the rigorous approach to success of ATL with a
quantitative analysis of the possible outcome of strategies. The resulting
logic goes well beyond the usual ”all-or-nothing” reasoning: Instead of al-
ways looking at the opponents’ most dangerous response, we assume them
to select strategies according to some probability measure. To this end, we
define new cooperation modalities 〈〈A〉〉pωγ with the intuitive reading that
group A has a strategy to enforce γ with probability p assuming that the op-
ponents behave according to the predicted behavior denoted byω. Although
we introduce two specific notions of success (one based on mixed response
strategies, the other on behavioral predictions), the idea of the success mea-
sure is generic and can be implemented according to the designer’s needs.
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This enables the framework to be used in a very flexible way and in various
scenarios.
We show that the semantics of pATL based on mixed responses embeds
ATL, while the semantics of pATL based on behavioral responses does not
(or, at least, not in a straightforwardway). Furthermore, we prove thatmodel
checkingpATLwithmixed responses is located betweenPP andPSPACE,
while the sameproblem for behavioral predictions canbe done in linear time
wrt the input size (i.e., no worse than for originalATL). Thus, we obtain the
surprising result that the first semantics (which looked more intuitive and
lessmathematically advanced at the first glance) turns out to be considerably
handicapped in terms of complexitywhen compared to the other semantics.
Related work includes research on probabilistic logics [21, 23], logics of
probability [4, 27, 13, 14, 3], and multi-valued modal logics [12, 10, 19, 20].
[19, 20, 14, 3] are particularly relevant, as they define multi-valued and/or
probabilistic variants of branching-time temporal logic. Our work comes
also close to [8, 9, 16, 17], where multi-valued variants of CTL and ATL are
studied in the context of Markov Decision Processes. Still, pATL is different
from all these approaches: it allows to reason about probabilities, but it is
neither a probabilistic logic nor a logic of probability. Also, it can be used
quantitative analysis of processes, but it is not a multi-valued logic based on
quantitative truth values: instead, it is a classical two-valued logic where the
quantitative part is sufficiently separated from the fundamental notion of
truth.
We thank Valentin Goranko and the anonymous referees for their com-
ments and discussion, and Hendrik Baumann for his help.
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